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Abstract. In this paper, we focused on a problem of authen-
tication on low-cost devices. We have proposed a new light-
weight protocol for mutual authentication of communication
entities with non-repudiation of realized events. The pro-
tocol is simple and suitable for implementation on low-cost
devices. Non-repudiation of realized events is achieved by
involving a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to the communication.
The proposed protocol uses only an appropriate light-weight
hash function and pre-shared secret data. Security of the
proposed protocol was verified by the BAN (Burrows-Abadi-
Needham) logic.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the wireless communication has been
used in many areas. One important area using the wire-
less communication is IoT (Internet of Things) which repre-
sents a type of network where low-cost devices linked to the
internet perform information exchange. Low-cost devices
represent computationally, memory and power constrained
devices. IoT is used in smart homes, smart hospitals, smart
cities, etc. According to [1], it is expected that IoT, which ex-
cludes PCs, tablets and smartphones, will grow to 24 billion
units installed in 2020. This is a huge number of devices.
Data created by these devices involved in the IoT must be
secured in order to be credible. IoT usually uses low-cost
devices to collect and exchange data from sensors and other
equipments by Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), Radio Fre-
quency Identification (RFID) technology, 3G and 4G mobile
connections, Wi-Fi, WiMAX and etc.
Common cryptographic algorithms as the asymmetric
cryptosystem RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) with the mod-
ulus size 2048 bits or the symmetric cipher AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) with the key size 256 bits cannot be
implemented on low-cost devices since these algorithms are
demanding in terms of the computing power and memory
resources. For that reason, security on low-cost devices
is ensured by algorithms from light-weight cryptography.
Light-weight cryptography uses algorithmswhich have small
demands to the computing power and the memory resources.
In most cases, light-weight cryptography uses symmetric
cryptography to ensure security. Symmetric cryptography
is generally less computationally and memory demanding
in comparison with asymmetric cryptography. The basic
terms in security are authentication, integrity, confidential-
ity and non-repudiation. Authentication ensures a verifica-
tion of authenticity of communication entities. Integrity en-
sures a verification of data integrity. Confidentiality ensures
that secret data cannot be available to unauthorized entities.
Non-repudiation ensures that an entity cannot deny some fact
which was realized in the past.
In this paper, we focus on authentication on low-cost
devices which are used in IoT. We have proposed a new
light-weight protocol for mutual authentication of communi-
cation entities with non-repudiation of realized events. Non-
repudiation is ensured by involving a TTP to the commu-
nication. In Sec. 2 an overview of the most widely used
light-weight authentication protocols is given. The principle
of the proposed protocol is described in Sec. 3 and its for-
mal security analysis is performed in Sec. 4. Demands to
computing resources and transmitted data in the protocol are
described in Sec. 5. Finally, the paper is concluded in Sec. 6.
2. State of the Art
Many authentication protocols for low-cost devices
were proposed. There are various different ways how to
create a light-weight authentication protocol. The authors
of [2], [3] presented an authentication protocol suitable for
implementation in low-cost RFID which uses Lattice based
cryptography. In the papers [4], [5], the authors use Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) for authentication. The authors
of [6] presented an authentication scheme for WSN which
is based on implicit certificates and it provides application
level end-to-end security. In the articles [7], [8], light-weight
authentication protocols which use McEliece public cryp-
tography were presented. The authors of [9] and [10] de-
signed light-weight authentication protocols for RFID which
use an error correction code. The authors of [11] use the
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Fermat Number Transform (FNT) and the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem (CRT) for light-weight authentication. In [12],
a novel authentication protocol for RFID tags using shared
pseudonyms andCyclic RedundancyCheck (CRC) to achieve
a reader to tag authentication was proposed. More sug-
gestions of light-weight authentication protocols using CRC
were described in [13], [14]. The authors of [15] presented
a light-weight authentication protocol which uses a ring vari-
ant of the LPN (Learning Parity with Noise) problem. In the
paper [16], a light-weight authentication protocol for RFID
using a stream cipher was described. The authors of [17]
proposed a lightweight message authentication scheme for
smart grids which uses the Diffie-Hellman protocol to es-
tablish the shared session key and a hash function for au-
thentication. Another light-weight authentication protocol
using a hash function was presented in [18]. In [19], a light-
weight authentication protocol for RFID using pseudonyms
and simple bitwise operations as AND, OR, XOR and bit-
wise rotation was described. The authors of [20] presented
a light-weight authentication protocol which uses Physical
Unclonable Functions (PUF), Linear Feedback Shift Regis-
ters (LFSR) and XOR operations. In [21], a light-weight
authentication protocol which uses a PUF and the Hopper
Blum (HB) protocol was described.
Presented light-weight authentication protocols often
focus on concrete low-cost devices which determine their
security. Simple authentication schemes using CRC and bit-
wise logical operations do not provide integrity of transmitted
data. Authentication protocols which use a stream cipher can
produce a lower level of diffuse which facilitates cryptanaly-
sis. Authentication protocols built on elliptic curves can be
broken using the Shor’s algorithm [22] in the case of con-
structing a universal quantum computer. Due to advances
in the quantum area, the future use of these authentication
protocols seems unpromising. The protection against attacks
led from universal quantum computers providing protocols
which use Lattice based cryptography, McEliece cryptog-
raphy, hash functions or generally symmetric cryptography.
Hash functions have small demands to the computing power
and memory resources while provide integrity of data and
robust security to input data, therefore, they are the most
used cryptographic primitive on low-cost devices to ensure
authentication. PUF represent a new perspective way how
to ensure authentication on low-cost devices. PUF represent
an alternative to common storage secret keys in nonvolatile
memories. PUF utilize manufacturing heterogeneities and
differences of components of a physical device to generate
random outputs (secret keys) on the fly. The generated out-
put of PUF is called a hardware fingerprint of the device.
The advantages of PUF are reduction of a price and increas-
ing of security. The main disadvantage of PUF is a noise
in generated outputs. These errors in PUF outputs are usu-
ally corrected by an error correction code. The disadvantage
of an error correction code is that it requires a permanent
memory which increases the price of the device.
3. Our Proposal of Authentication Pro-
tocol
Based on the analysis of light-weight authentication
protocols provided in Sec. 2, we have proposed a new light-
weight mutual authentication protocol with non-repudiation
of realized events. The protocol is suitable for implemen-
tation on low-cost devices used in IoT. There are a Trusted
Third Party and the User A and the User B in the proto-
col. The proposed protocol uses only an appropriate light-
weight hash function and pre-shared secret data. The protocol
ensures authenticity of communication entities, integrity of
transmitted data, security of secret authentication keys and
non-repudiation of realized events. The proposed protocol
uses a TTP to ensure non-repudiation of realized events. Ac-
cording to the standard ISO/IEC 13888-2:2010 the TTP can
be used to ensure non-repudiation using symmetric cryptog-
raphy. This standard provides a description of generic struc-
tures that can be used for non-repudiation services and it
also describes some specific communication-related mecha-
nisms which can be used to provide non-repudiation of origin
and non-repudiation of delivery. The ISO/IEC 13888-2:2010
relies on the existence of a TTP to prevent fraudulent repudia-
tion or accusation. An online TTP is usually needed. Table 1
shows notations used in our protocol and their meaning. Fig-
ure 1 shows the principle of mutual authentication of the
User A and the User B using the TTP with non-repudiation
of realized events.
Notation Description
IDx The unique identifier of an entity x. The size of
IDx = 128 b.
‖ The bitwise concatenation operation.
001 – 111 The value in bites which defines the composi-
tion of following data. The size of 000 – 111 =
3 b.
H () A one-way cryptographic hash function with
the digest size = 160 b.
h1 – h10 The output of a cryptographic hash function.
The size of h1 – h10 = 160 b.
KAB The secret authentication key shared between
the User A and the User B. The size of KAB =
160 b.
KATTP The secret authentication key shared between
the User A and the TTP. The size of
KATTP = 160 b.
KBTTP The secret authentication key shared be-
tween the User B and the TTP. The size of
KBTTP = 160 b.
SnAB The public sequence number shared between the
User A and the User B. The size of SnAB = 16
b.
SnATTP The public sequence number shared between the
User A and the TTP. The size of SnATTP = 16 b.
SnBTTP The public sequence number shared between the
User B and the TTP. The size of SnBTTP = 16 b.
Snx +=1 It represents increasing the sequence number x
by one.
Tab. 1. Notations used in our protocol.
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User A (A)
(IDA, IDB, IDTTP, KAB, KATTP)
User B (B)
(IDA, IDB, IDTTP, KAB, KBTTP)
 IDTTP || IDA || 001 || IDB || SnAB +=1 ||  h1 = H (SnAB +=1 || KAB) || SnATTP +=1 ||    h2 = H ( IDTTP ||  
IDA || 001 || IDB || SnAB +=1 || h1 || SnATTP +=1 || KATTP)
 IDB || IDTTP || 010 || IDA || SnAB ||  h1 || SnATTP || h2 || SnBTTP +=1 || h3 = H (IDB || IDTTP || 010 || 
IDA || SnAB ||  h1 || SnATTP || h2 || SnBTTP +=1 || KBTTP)
IDTTP || IDB || 011 || IDA || SnAB +=1 || h4 = H (SnAB +=1 || KAB) || SnBTTP +=1 ||      h5 = H ( IDTTP ||   
IDB || 011 || IDA || SnAB +=1|| h4 || SnBTTP +=1 || KBTTP)
 IDA || IDTTP || 100 || IDB || SnAB || h4 || SnBTTP  || h5 || SnATTP +=1 || h6 = H (IDA || IDTTP || 100 || 
IDB || SnAB || h4 || SnBTTP  || h5 || SnATTP +=1 || KATTP)
 IDTTP || IDA || 101 || IDB || SnAB +=1 || h7 = H (SnAB +=1 || KAB) || SnATTP +=1 ||     h8 = H (IDTTP ||   
IDA || 101 || IDB || SnAB +=1 || h7 || SnATTP +=1 || KATTP)
Trusted Third Party  (TTP)




 IDB || IDTTP || 110 || IDA || SnAB || h7 || SnATTP || h8 || SnBTTP +=1 || h9 = H ( IDB || IDTTP || 110 || 
IDA || SnAB || h7 || SnATTP || h8 || SnBTTP +=1 || KBTTP)



















Fig. 1. Principle of authentication of User A and User B using TTP with non-repudiation of realized events.
The proposed protocol consists of the two phases, an ini-
tialization phase and an authentication phase. The initializa-
tion phasemust be performed before the authentication phase.
Entities involved in the protocol exchange pre-shared data in
the initialization phase. A communication between commu-
nication sides is ensured by a wireless communication in the
initialization phase. The communicating entities approach
so that transmitted data cannot be captured by an attacker
in the initialization phase. The User A and the User B ex-
change their unique public identifiers IDA, IDB and a secret
authentication key KAB. The User A and the TTP exchange
their unique public identifiers IDA, IDTTP and a secret au-
thentication key KATTP. The User B and the TTP exchange
their unique public identifiers IDB, IDTTP and a secret au-
thentication key KBTTP. The User A must keep secret the
authentication keys KAB and KATTP. The User B must keep
secret the authentication keys KAB and KBTTP. The TTPmust
keep secret the authentication keys KATTP and KBTTP. The
unique identifiers IDA, IDB and IDTTP are public values. The
principle of mutual authentication with non-repudiation of
realized events is depicted in Fig. 1. In this case, the com-
munication is started by the User A. If the communication
starts by the User B, the principle will be mirrored opposite.
Seven messages, which are exchanged between the TTP, the
User A and the User B, are used in the authentication phase.
In the messages 1 – 7, the first ID defines the recipi-
ent of the messages 1 – 7, the second ID defines the sender
of the messages 1 – 7 and the third ID defines the recipi-
ent of authentication data (in the messages 1, 3 and 5) and
the sender of authentication data (in the messages 2, 4 and
6). Authentication data represent hashes (which include the
secret authentication key KAB) and their corresponding se-
quence numbers. The hashes h2, h3, h5, h6, h8, h9 and h10
ensure integrity and authenticity of the messages 1 – 7. All
transmitted data with the secret authentication key (KATTP or
KBTTP) are inserted to the input of the hash function. Output
hashes are inserted after transmitted data in the messages 1 –
7. Authentication between the User A and the TTP is ensured
using the secret authentication key KATTP and the sequence
number SnATTP in the hashes h2, h6 and h8. Authentication
between the User B and the TTP is ensured using the secret
authentication key KBTTP and the sequence number SnBTTP
in the hashes h3, h5, h9 and h10. Authentication between the
User A and B is ensured using the secret authentication key
KAB and the sequence number SnAB in the hashes h1, h4
and h7.
The principle of authentication between communica-
tion entities is as follows. An entity creates an authentication
hash using the secret authentication key and the sequence
number (in the hashes h1, h4 and h7) and using other data
(in the hashes h2, h3, h5, h6, h8, h9 and h10). After that, the
entity sends the created authentication hash with sequence
number and other data to an opposite entity. The opposite
entity compares the received authentication hash with its own
authentication hash which the entity computed by the hash
function using the received sequence number (and other data)
and its own secret authentication key which shares with the
communication entity. If they are equal, integrity and au-
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thenticity of transmitted data will be guaranteed. After that
the opposite entity compares the received sequence number
with the sequence number which used in the previous com-
munication with the communication entity. If the received
sequence number is bigger than the sequence number which
the opposite entity used in the previous communication with
the entity, the freshness of the authentication hash will be
guaranteed.
In the case when a communication is started by the
User A, the hash h1 represents the requirement for authenti-
cation of the User A to the User B and the hash h2 represents
the proof of sending the hash h1. The hash h4 represents the
requirement for authentication of the User B to the User A
(also represents the confirmation of realized authentication
of the User A to the User B) and the hash h5 represents the
proof of sending the hash h4. The hash h7 represents the
confirmation of realized authentication of the User B to the
User A and the hash h8 represents the proof of sending the
hash h7. The User B saves the hashes h1 and h2 and the
corresponding sequence numbers SnAB and SnATTP to his
database for the case of dispute, when the User A will argue
that he did not send the request to authentication to the User B
through the TTP. The User A saves the hashes h4 and h5 and
the corresponding sequence numbers SnAB and SnBTTP to his
database for the case of dispute, when the User B will argue
that he did not authenticate the User A and he did not send
the request to authentication to the User A through the TTP.
The User B saves the hashes h7 and h8 and the corresponding
sequence numbers SnAB and SnATTP to his database for the
case of dispute, when the User A will argue that he did not
authenticate the User B.
An entity involved in the authentication phase (the TTP,
the User A and the User B) sends a message to a counterpart
and waits the specific time for a response. If the entity does
not receive the response to the sent message in the specific
time from the counterpart, the entity will resend that message
to the counterpart. Each message can be repeatedly sent only
several times. The number of repeatedly sent messages must
be chosen suitably for the concrete environment.
In the case when a communication is started by the
User A, three following disputes may occur in our protocol:
1.) The User B claims that he received the request for authen-
tication from the User A through the TTP while the User A
claims that he did not send the request for authentication to
the User B through the TTP.
2.) TheUserA claims that hewas authenticated by theUser B
and that he received the request for authentication from the
User B trought the TTP while the User B claims that he did
not authenticate the User A and he did not send the request
for authentication to the User A through the TTP.
3.) The User B claims that he was authenticated by the
User A while the User A claims that he did not authenticate
the User B.
The TTP solves these dispute in the following way. The
User B will send hashes h1, h2, h7, h8 and the corresponding
sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP to the TTP for the solution
of the dispute 1 and 3. The User A will send hashes h4, h5
and the corresponding sequence numbers SnAB and SnBTTP
to the TTP for the solution of the dispute 2. The TTP cre-




8 using constants, the received values
from the User B and the User A and using its own secret key
KATTP and KBTTP. The TTP compares the received hashes
with computed hashes. If they are equal, the TTP will agree
with the User B in the dispute 1 and 3 and with the User A
in the dispute 2.
4. Security Analysis of Authentication
Protocol
Security of the initialization phase is based on the se-
cure channel. Security of the authentication phase with non-
repudiation of realized events is based on cryptographic prop-
erties of hash functions, secret authentication keys, sequence
numbers and the trust of the User A and the User B to the
TTP. If the authentication key is revealed by an attacker, the
authentication key will be invalidated for future communica-
tions. In the authentication phase the following cryptographic
properties are ensured:
Authenticity – Authentication of the User A and the User B
is ensured by a hash function and the secret shared key KAB,
which is transmitted in the hashes h1, h4 and h7. Authentica-
tion of the User A and the TTP is ensured by a hash function
and the secret shared key KATTP, which is transmitted in the
hashes h2, h6 and h8. Authentication of the User B and the
TTP is ensured by a hash function and the secret shared key
KBTTP, which is transmitted in the hashes h3, h5, h9 and h10.
Unrepeatability – Unrepeatability of transmitted data is en-
sured by the public sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP and
SnBTTP. The sequence number SnAB is transmitted in the
hashes h1, h4 and h7. The sequence number SnATTP is trans-
mitted in the hashes h2, h6 and h8. The sequence number
SnBTTP is transmitted in the hashes h3, h5, h9 and h10. En-
tities involved in the protocol do not respond to messages
containing the sequence number which is less or equal to the
last correctly used sequence number between communication
parties.
Integrity – Integrity of transmitted data is ensured by a hash
function in the steps 1 – 7. All transmitted data are inserted
on the input of the hash function in the each step. The out-
put hashes h2, h3, h5, h6, h8, h9 and h10 are attached after the
transmitted data in the steps 1 – 7. The receiver computes
a hash with using received data and his secret authentication
key and compares it with the hash which received together
with transmitted data. If they are equal, integrity and authen-
ticity of transmitted data will be ensured.
Security – Security of the secret authentication keys
KAB, KATTP and KBTTP is ensured by a hash function. The
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hash function is a one-way compression function⇒ it is not
possible to get the input values from the output of the hash
function.
Uniformity – Uniformity of hashes h2, h3, h5, h6, h8, h9 and
h10 is ensured by the sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP and
SnBTTP and a hash function. A change of one bit on the input
of the hash function causes an unpredictable random change
of all output bits with 50% probability. This feature of hash
functions ensures that very similar messages have different
output hashes.
Non-repudiation – Non-repudiation of sending the request
for authentication and realized authentication is ensured by
the TTP. When the communication is started by the User A,
the hash h2 represents the proof of submission of the request
for authentication to the User B from the User A through the
TTP. The hash h5 represents the proof of realized authentica-
tion of the User A to the User B and the proof of submission
the request for authentication to the User A from the User B
through the TTP. The hash h8 represents the proof of realized
authentication of the User B to the User A through the TTP.
Authentication protocols must work correctly and
safely. Formal methods for an analysis of security cryp-
tographic protocols can be used for this purpose. These
methods are able to find security threats in cryptographic
protocols. The most widely used method for the formal anal-
ysis of authentication protocols is the BAN (Burrows, Abadi,
Needham) logic [23]. We provided formal analysis of the
authentication phase in our protocol by the BAN logic. To
analyse the authentication phase, we give the following as-
sumptions by the BAN logic:
A believes A
KAB










↔ TTP, B believes B
KBTT P
↔ TTP,
A believes fresh (SnAB, SnATTP),
B believes fresh (SnAB, SnBTTP)
and TTP believes fresh (SnATTP, SnBTTP).
We analyse the idealized version of our protocol by ap-
plying rules of the BAN logic to the assumptions. We give
many of the formal details necessary for the proof only for
the message 1 for brevity.






↔ B >KAB, SnATTP,A
KATTP
↔ TTP >KATTP .
The main steps of the proof are as follows:
The TTP receives the message 1. The annotation rules yield
that





↔ B >KAB, SnATTP,A
KATTP
↔ TTP >KATTP




The message-meaning rule for shared secrets applies and
yields the following:






We break conjunctions and then we produce
TTP believes A said (SnATTP,A
KATTP
↔ TTP).
Moreover, we have the following hypothesis:
TTP believes fresh (SnATTP).
The nonce-verification rule applies and yields
TTP believes A believes (SnATTP,A
KATTP
↔ TTP).
Again, we break the conjunction to obtain the following:
TTP believes A believes A
KATTP
↔ TTP.
This concludes the analysis of the message 1 of the authenti-
cation phase in the proposed protocol.
The proposed protocol should be resistant to the attacks
which are shown in Tab. 2. Table 2 also shows the ways
which are used to a protection against the mentioned attacks.
The protection against the replay attack is ensured by the se-
quence numbers SnAB, SnATTP and SnBTTP. The Man in the
Middle (MiM) attack is not possible because the secret au-
thentication keys KAB, KATTP and KBTTP are exchanged by the
secure channel in the initialization phase. The eavesdropping
attack is not possible because the secret authentication keys
KAB, KATTP and KBTTP are protected by a hash function. It is
not possible to get the input values from the output hash of the
Attack Method of protection
Replay attack The sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP
and SnBTTP.
Man in the middle
(MiM) attack
The secret authentication keys
KAB, KATTP and KBTTP are ex-
changed in the initialization phase by
a secure channel.
Eavesdropping attack The secret authentication keys
KAB, KATTP and KBTTP are protected
by a one-way hash function.
Desynchronization
attack
The sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP




Protocol does not use the IF and DL
problem, elliptic curves, hyperelliptic
curves, class groups, etc.
Tab. 2. Ineffective attacks to our proposed protocol andmethods
of protections against these attacks.
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hash function. The desynchronization attack is not possible
since the sequence numbers SnAB, SnATTP and SnBTTP are
transmitted as public values. From this reason, communica-
tion parties always know the value of the sequence number
used in the authentication hash (h1 – h10). The attack using
the Shor’s algorithm [22] is not possible since our protocol
does not use the integer factorization problem, the problem of
the discrete logarithm, elliptic curves, hyperelliptic curves,
class groups and etc.
In our proposed protocol a hash function with the di-
gest size equal 160 bits is intended. The hash function with
the digest size equal 160 bits has effective security equal to
80 bits because the birthday paradox decreases security of
hash functions to half. The authentication keys must be up-
dated after using up the range of the sequence numbers. For
the sequence number equal to 16 bits, the authentication key
may be used 216 (65 536) times. Authentication keys may be
saved in a Secure Element which represents a tamper resis-
tant hardware platform, capable of storing confidential and
cryptographic data.
5. Demands of Proposed Protocol
Our authentication protocol has low demands to com-
puting resources and transmitted data. The entities involved
in the protocol compute only a light-weight hash function.
Table 3 shows demands to computing resources and trans-
mitted data of our protocol in the authentication phase for the
User A, the TTP and the User B.
The User A performs the calculation of a hash function
6 times during the execution of the protocol. The User B
and the TTP performs the calculation of the hash function
7 times during the execution of the protocol. Transmitted
data by the User A are equal to 1350 b in the authentication
phase. Transmitted data by the User B are equal to 1206 b
in the authentication phase. Transmitted data by the TTP are
equal to 2457 b in the authentication phase. Total transmitted
data by the TTP, the User A and B are equal to 5013 b in the
authentication phase.
The authors of [24] implemented different light-weight
hash functions on anATMELAVRATtiny45 8-bit microcon-
troller and provided their performance evaluation. Table 4
shows memory requirements and a performance of light-
weight hash functions PHOTON-160/36/36, SPONGENT-
160/160/80 and Keccak [r = 40, c = 160]. These hash func-
tions have the digest size equal to 160 b. In Tab. 4 there are
the code size in bytes, the size of needed memory for RAM
state and others in bytes and the cycle count for 100-byte
message of selected light-weight hash functions.
Table 5 shows demands to hardware area in GE
(Gate Equivalent) for selected light-weight hash func-
tions. Hash functions PHOTON-160/36/36, SPONGENT-
160/160/80 and Keccak [r = 40, c = 160] are suitable for
implementation in our protocol. From Tab. 4 and 5 it fol-
lows that Keccak [r = 40, c = 160] is the most suitable for
implementation in our protocol.
User A TTP User B
Hash func-
tion
6x (2x in the
steps 1, 4, 5)
7x (1x in the
steps 1 – 7)
7x (2x in the
steps 2, 3, 6




1350 b (675 b
in the steps 1
and 5)
2457 b (819 b
in the steps 2,
4 and 6)
1206 b (675 b
in the step 3
and 531 b in
the step 7)
Tab. 3. Demands of proposed protocol.










764 39 2 793 265
SPONGENT-
160/160/80
598 60 4 771 186
Keccak
[r=40,c=160]
752 45 278 269
Tab. 4. Properties of light-weight hash functions implemented







Area [GE] 1396 [25] 1730 [26] 1300 [27]
Tab. 5. Hardware area of selected light-weight hash functions.
Our protocol is aimed to use in low-rate wireless per-
sonal area networks (LR-WPANs), which are defined in the
standard 802.15.4. For example, the specification ZigBee
falls under this standard. Typically, for the ZigBee pro-
tocol, the required latency is in the range approximately
16–32 ms [28].
If authentication is ensured by the principle of the one-
time pad technique in a combinationwith symmetric cryptog-
raphy (stream cipher or block cipher), demands for resources
will grow. Since communication entities must keep random
authentication keys in a database, they must be updated after
their exhaustion. Also, the generation of true random num-
bers for the one-time pad technique is an expensive question.
If a stream cipher is used, integrity of transmitted data will
not be ensured.
6. Conclusion
In this paper a new light-weight mutual authentication
protocol with non-repudiation of realized events was pre-
sented. Our protocol is simple and uses only a light-weight
hash function and incrementation of public sequence num-
bers. The advantages of the proposed protocol are its simplic-
ity, low computing and memory demands, ensuring integrity
of transmitted data, non-repudiation of realized events by
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symmetric cryptography and resistance against attacks com-
ing fromuniversal quantumcomputers (using the Shor’s algo-
rithm) in comparison with other light-weight authentication
protocols. In the our feature work, we will implement the
proposed protocol onRFID, Smart cards andwireless sensors
and we will measure its performance, memory requirements
and resistance against side channel attacks.
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